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CARL SCHMITT AND THE CRITIQUE OF LAWFARE
David Luban
(forthcoming, Case Western International Law Review, symposium on lawfare)

ABSTRACT
“Lawfare” is the use of law as a weapon of war against a military adversary. Lawfare
critics complain that self-proclaimed “humanitarians” are really engaged in the partisan
and political abuse of law—lawfare. This paper turns the mirror on lawfare critics
themselves, and argues that the critique of lawfare is no less abusive and political than
the alleged lawfare it attacks. Radical lawfare critics view humanitarian law with
suspicion, as nothing more than an instrument used by weak adversaries against strong
military powers. Casting suspicion on humanitarian law by attacking the motives of
humanitarian lawyers, they undermine disinterested argument, and ultimately undermine
the validity of their own critique.
The paper then explores the vision of politics and law underlying the lawfare
critique through a reading of the most significant theorist who defends that vision, the
German theorist Carl Schmitt. Through a reading and critique of Schmitt, the article
examines both the force of the lawfare critique and its flaws.

I. INTRODUCTION
“Lawfare” is the use of law as a weapon of war against a military adversary. Law
can be weaponized in many ways, but easiest is accusing the adversary of war crimes,
thereby subjecting him to harassment through litigation and bad publicity. War crimes
accusations are not the only method of lawfare, of course. The U.S. government lawyers
who wrote the torture memos, contriving legal arguments to legitimize Central
Intelligence Agency (CIA) torture, were engaged in lawfare of a different sort; indeed,
John Yoo, the best-known of these lawyers, indirectly boasted about lawfare by titling his
memoir War By Other Means,1 an ingenious twist on the Clausewitizian dictum that war
is politics by other means. In his view, apparently, the law he practiced in his
government service was war by other means, which is simply another name for lawfare.
In other contexts as well, states can wage lawfare just as non-state actors can. Major
General Charles J. Dunlap, Jr., who popularized the term “lawfare,” points out that
lawfare “can operate as a positive ‘good,’” and details several examples in which the
United States has “substitut[ed] lawfare methodologies for traditional material means.”2
My chief example of lawfare, though, will be accusations by non-state actors of war
crimes by a powerful, modern army. That is surely what today’s shouting is about.

University Professor and Professor of Law and Philosophy, Georgetown University Law Center.
JOHN YOO, WAR BY OTHER MEANS: AN INSIDER’S ACCOUNT OF THE WAR ON TERROR (2006).
2
Charles J. Dunlap, Commentary, Lawfare Today: A Perspective, 3 YALE J. INT’L AFF. 146, 146–47
(2008).
1

2
Although the term “lawfare” can be used purely descriptively, as General Dunlap
does, it usually is not.3 “Lawfare” is a pejorative and polemical word. To accuse someone
of lawfare is to accuse them of something sneaky. There are two pieces to the accusation.
First is the insinuation that those who wage lawfare are fighting by cowardly means. That
was the implication of a much-remarked sentence from the National Defense Strategy of
the United States in 2002 and 2005: “Our strength as a nation state will continue to be
challenged by those who employ a strategy of the weak using international fora, judicial
processes, and terrorism.”4 Lumping judicial processes together with terrorism as part of
a “strategy” is equivalent to accusing those who take the United States government to
court with lawfare of a particularly vile sort, and labeling lawfare “a strategy of the
weak” is a taunt. Why doesn’t the enemy just come out and fight like real men, instead of
pretending to be disinterested adherents to legality?
Second, the lawfare accusation implicitly assumes that “lawriors”—as I shall call
those who engage in lawfare—are abusing the law by making unfounded accusations of
illegality against their enemies. The lawrior poses as a disinterested legal actor who, more
in sorrow than in anger, calls the world’s attention to war crimes by a party who, just by
coincidence, happens to be the adversary. Such accusations are factually or legally
baseless. So lawfare is a double affront, against both martial virtue and legal virtue.
Let me say a bit more about why lawfare offends against legal virtue. Lawfare is a
species of the politicization of law. Legitimate legal claims appeal to standards that
transcend the particular case and the particular parties. Legal claims are never supposed
to be demands backed by nothing but the will of the parties—”give it to me because I
want it!”—but rather demands backed by claims under neutral standards, taking the form
“give it to me because I have a legal right to it!” Of course we are entitled to skepticism
about the political neutrality of the law at all levels: legislation, access to legal
institutions, judicial interpretation, and application of law to facts. But law can and does
hold out the promise of at least relative neutrality and relative depoliticization—
compared with partisan mud-slinging, dirty tricks, and armed conflict; and it is hard to
see how law could fool so many people so much of the time if it never delivered on the
promise.
The lawfare critic accuses the enemy lawrior of politicizing law, presumably for
base reasons. Specifically, the lawfare critic accuses the enemy lawrior of abusing
international humanitarian law and international criminal law to hamstring or at least
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harass enemy military planners.5 The past decade has seen two major eruptions of the
lawfare critique.6 The first was by the United States during the Bush Administration, and
the second was by Israel and American supporters of Israel in the wake of the Goldstone
Report. In the first case, the accusations were that the governments of “old Europe” and
nongovernmental organizations like the International Committee of the Red Cross
(ICRC) aimed to undermine U.S. tactics in the War on Terror for essentially political
motives.7 Here, the accusation of lawfare was indirect: no one accused the ICRC or
western Europeans of intentionally aiding al-Qaeda, although some lawfare critics
insinuated that the Europeans might have a geopolitical agenda of hobbling U.S. military
dominance.8 Rather, the accusation was that the humanitarian groups are the jihadis’
useful idiots. The reaction to the Goldstone Report was different: here, the accusation
was, in the words of journalist Jeffrey Goldberg, that Richard Goldstone was “the chief of
the hanging party” whose “mandate . . . was to find Israel guilty.”9 This is a more direct
accusation of intentional and deliberate lawfare than in the American debate.
Just as the accusation of lawfare is a species of the broader accusation of
politicizing law—specifically, that lawriors politicize law for someone’s military
advantage—it is also a species of ad hominem argument. By unmasking the recourse to
humanitarian law as lawfare on behalf of an interested party’s military goals, lawfare
critics deflects attention from the substance of the legal claims to the self-interest and
sneaky motives of the person entering them. Like all ad hominem arguments, the lawfare
critique has the rhetorical function of diverting attention from what classical rhetoric
called the logos of an argument—its substance—to its ethos—the character of the
speaker.10 The logos in this case is the argument that soldiers have committed war
crimes; the ethos is the insidious and militarized motives of making those accusations.
Of course, ad hominem criticism is itself the primary technique of politicized
argument. Lawfare critics are themselves engaged in lawfare. Not that critiques of
lawfare are necessarily a form of lawfare, just as not all war crimes accusations are a
form of lawfare. Sometimes an argument is just an argument. But the most conspicuous
5
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lawfare critics are suspicious of the claims of self-proclaimed humanitarian and human
rights lawyers to be disinterested. Engaged in mortal combat against the lawriors, lawfare
critics have no more use for disinterested inquiry than does a soldier on a battlefield.11
Some issues seem to lend themselves to politicized academic treatment because
they tap into high-stakes public controversies, however indirectly. Some years ago, I was
working on a law-and-literature paper about the trial scene in Aeschylus’s Oresteia, and
my research led to questions about whether there has ever been a historical matriarchy.12
One famous 1861 interpretation of the Oresteia maintains that its legend derives from an
actual conquest of a matriarchal Greek society by patriarchal Dorian invaders.13 Frederick
Engels accepted this interpretation in The Origins of the Family, Private Property, and
the State, and as a result it became official dogma in the Communist world.14 I discovered
that it was virtually impossible to find classicists on either side of the question of
historical matriarchy who were not caught up in Cold War polemics. It was difficult for
an outsider to the debate, such as myself, who had no dog in the fight, to find scholarship
that did not smell unreliable.15 Apparently, the Cold War sucked even an obscure
question of anthropology and archaeology into a political vortex, and pulled the scholars
in with it. Another example is the tiresome and endless debate about punitive damages
and alleged American litigiousness and runaway juries. Some years ago I attended an
academic conference on punitive damages with a distinguished speaker-list that was quite
balanced between the “pros,” the “antis,” and the “empiricists” who actually had data
about the incidence of punitive damages. The morning the conference began, its
dismayed organizer announced that the pro-business, anti-punitive damages speakers had
pulled out. It seems that the general counsel of a major insurance company had read the
papers in draft and concluded that the empirical studies were too damning to the antipunitive damages side. Therefore the conference must be delegitimized by appearing to
be one-sided business bashing. She organized corporate clients to instruct their counsel
on the speaker’s program to pull out of the conference. The conference organizer was
flabbergasted. As I recall, only one pro-business speaker remained. Today’s lawfare
debate has many of the earmarks of these other debates: the scholarship always contains
veiled polemical subtext that outsiders to the debate can sense even if they cannot decode
it.16 Ultimately, readers who honestly want to form an opinion and who come to the
11
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scholarship for insight rather than validation of prior political positions will be
disappointed. They will conclude, as I did reading the “historical matriarchy” literature,
that hardly any of it is trustworthy. Not only are the legal issues politicized, but the
academic debates about them are as well.
The lawfare critique is not simply that those accusing states of war crimes have
ulterior motives, which would not be an interesting charge. Of course they have ulterior
motives. Anyone who voluntarily has recourse to the institutions of the law has ulterior
motives: nobody ever files a lawsuit out of disinterested curiosity in the answer to a legal
question. In everyday litigation, we hardly think it noteworthy or morally condemnable to
learn that a plaintiff has a self-interested motive for the suit; if she didn’t, we might in
fact deny her standing. Undoubtedly, the ICRC has its own institutional interest in
defending its interpretation of international humanitarian law. Undoubtedly, Hamas had
ulterior motives in steering the Goldstone Commission to some witnesses rather than
others, just as Israel had ulterior motives in hampering Goldstone’s investigation. Any
competent lawyer has strategic reasons behind her choice of which legal arguments she
will advance, when she will advance them, and in which forum. If strategic, goal-oriented
planning behind legal arguments is the hallmark of lawfare, all litigation is like lawfare.
The only difference is the specific military nature of the goal, that is, that legal success
will constrain a state’s military forces by declaring some of their tactics legally off-limits.
The real issue, as in domestic litigation, is not whether parties have ulterior motives, but
whether the ulterior motives can be backed with valid legal arguments—whether logos
underlies ethos and pathos. To insinuate that advancing such arguments is lawfare, and
hence illegitimate, is to insinuate that law should never constrain armed might. Thus the
radical critique of lawfare amounts to an assault on international humanitarian law and
international criminal law as such.
II. Carl Schmitt as Lawfare Critic
I am interested in the intellectual genealogy of the lawfare critique. Is there a
coherent philosophy behind the mistrust of humanitarian law as a tool or pretext for
disarming a state’s military? In my view, such a philosophy exists in one of the most
significant and famous works of political theory of the twentieth century, Carl Schmitt’s
1932 essay The Concept of the Political.17 Schmitt was a conservative jurist and
philosopher during the Weimar Republic. He fell into eclipse after World War II because
he had been a legal publicist for the Nazi Party, and had published some anti-Semitic
Terrorism and the End of Human Rights, in WAR AFTER SEPTEMBER 11 51 (Verna V. Gehring ed., 2002).
See also David Luban, Lawfare and Legal Ethics in Guantánamo, 60 STAN. L. REV. 1981 (2008)
(criticizing U.S. officials for trying to undermine legal representations of Guantánamo detainees, and
arguing that these efforts may have been lawfare responding to perceived lawfare by the Guantánamo
defense bar). Such criticism might also fall under hostile scrutiny from lawfare critics. I respond that
sometimes an argument is just an argument.
17
CARL SCHMITT, THE CONCEPT OF THE POLITICAL (expanded ed. trans. George Schwab, 2007). This
expanded edition also contains Leo Strauss’s Notes on Carl Schmitt, The Concept of the Political (trans. J.
Harvey Lomax), and Schmitt’s 1929 paper The Age of Neutralizations and Depoliticizations (trans.
Matthias Konzett & John P. McCormick). The latter paper is essentially a continuation of The Concept of
the Political, and Strauss’s important comments on Schmitt refer to it. The edition also contains an
extremely valuable introductory essay by Tracy B. Strong, Foreword: Dimensions of the New Debate
around Carl Schmitt.
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writings.18 In the 1970s, Schmitt went through a curious revival by theorists on the left,
and, after 9/11, interest in him ratcheted up again, largely because of his writings that
support untrammeled executive power in the face of emergency.19 Many writers noticed
the “Schmittian” character of the Bush Administration’s constitutional arguments, and
political theorist and commentator Alan Wolfe included in his 2009 book The Future of
Liberalism a chapter bearing the wonderful title “Mr. Schmitt Goes to Washington.”20
Schmitt lived well into his 90s and was able to witness his own rehabilitation and indeed
his ultimate recognition as a major political thinker. And, like it or not, Schmitt is a major
political thinker, as well as a powerfully seductive and stimulating writer.
The fundamental proposition of The Concept of the Political is that properly
understood, “the political” refers solely to the friend-enemy distinction.21 Furthermore,
“[t]he friend and enemy concepts are to be understood in their concrete and existential
sense, not as metaphors or symbols,”22 and “[t]he friend, enemy, and combat concepts
receive their real meaning precisely because they refer to the real possibility of physical
killing.”23 Schmitt does not mean that politics always involves physical warfare: “War is
neither the aim nor the purpose nor even the very content of politics. But as an ever
present possibility, it is the leading presupposition which determines in a characteristic
way human action and thinking and thereby creates a specifically political behavior.”24
Schmitt also insists that “[t]he enemy in the political sense need not be hated
personally”; but that is irrelevant to whether we will kill him if necessary.25 We fight not
18

GOPAL BALAKRISHAN, THE ENEMY: AN INTELLECTUAL PORTRAIT OF CARL SCHMITT ( Verso Sept. 26,
2002). On Schmitt’s anti-Semitic writings, see HEINRICH MEIER, THE LESSON OF CARL SCHMITT 151-73
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ANATOMY OF ANTILIBERALISM 38-39, 50-53 (1993).
19
SCHMITT, supra note 17.
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the Political, supra note 17, offers an illuminating account of the twists and turns in the receptions of
Schmitt. The connection between Schmitt, Bush Administration policies, and the lawfare critique was
noted as long ago as 2005 by Scott Horton, who developed it in a terrific series of blog posts and articles:
Scott Horton, The Return of Carl Schmitt, BALKINIZATION (Nov. 7, 2005), available at
http://balkin.blogspot.com/2005/11/return-of-carl-schmitt.html; Scott Horton, Carl Schmitt and the Military
Commissions Act of 2006, BALKINIZATION (Oct. 16, 2006), available at
http://balkin.blogspot.com/2006/10/carl-schmitt-and-military-commissions_16.html; Scott Horton, Carl
Schmitt, the Dolchstoßlegende, and the Law of Armed Conflict, BALKINIZATION (Oct. 21, 2006), available
at http://balkin.blogspot.com/2006/10/carl-schmitt-dolchstolegende-and-law.html; Scott Horton, A Kinder,
Gentler Lawfare, HARPER’S MAG., Nov. 30, 2007, available at
http://www.harpers.org/archive/2007/11/hbc-90001803; Scott Horton, State of Exception: Bush’s War on
the Rule of Law, HARPER’S MAG., July 2007, available at
http://www.harpers.org/archive/2007/07/0081595. Schmitt has been adopted by anti-terrorism hawks. See
ERIC POSNER & ADRIAN VERMEULE, TERROR IN THE BALANCE: SECURITY, LIBERTY, AND THE COURTS 38
(2007) (purporting to “extract the marrow from Schmitt and throw away the bones”); cf. Alice Ristroph,
Professors Strangelove (review essay of Posner & Vermeule), 11 GREENBAG 2D 245, 248 (2008)
(describing their metaphor as “probably not the best image with which to invoke a theorist associated with
the Third Reich.”).
21
SCHMITT, supra note 17, at 26.
22
Id. at 27.
23
Id. at 33.
24
Id.
25
Id. at 29.
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out of personal hatred but because the enemy threatens our way of life. “If such physical
destruction of human life is not motivated by an existential threat to one’s own way of
life, then it cannot be justified. Just as little can war be justified by ethical and juristic
norms.”26 The fallacy of liberalism for Schmitt lies in the thought that man is intrinsically
good, so if we eradicate hatred we can eradicate enmity and killing. On the contrary, “all
genuine political theories presuppose man to be evil, i.e., by no means an unproblematic
but a dangerous and dynamic being.”27
It follows from Schmitt’s fundamental friend-enemy conception of politics that all
political groupings are oppositional—no enemies, no politics. The political world is by
definition a world of us and them, and a political community “which embraces the entire
globe and all of humanity cannot exist.”28 The ancient ideal of a cosmopolis, a
community of all humanity, is an apolitical fiction, and the fact that one of them, the
enemy, is just as human, just as decent, and just as lovable as one of us provides no
argument against killing him.
Of course people will continue to invoke the ideals of “humanity.” But in
Schmitt’s view, anyone who does so operates in bad faith. As he puts it in the most
memorable line in this very memorable book, “whoever invokes humanity wants to
cheat.”29 Not that there is anything wrong with cheating—that’s politics:
That wars are waged in the name of humanity . . . has an especially
intensive political meaning. When a state fights its political enemy in the
name of humanity, it is not a war for the sake of humanity, but a war
wherein a particular state seeks to usurp a universal concept against its
military opponent30
Humanitarianism is, in Schmitt’s view, extraordinarily dangerous. Fighting on behalf of
“humanity” makes your enemy “an outlaw of humanity” and allows you to do the most
terrible things to him.31 A war to end all war—”the absolute last war of humanity”—is
“necessarily unusually intense and inhuman because . . . it simultaneously degrades the
enemy into . . . a monster that must not only be defeated but also utterly destroyed.”32
And the word “humanity” is not the only polemical, political term masquerading
as a lofty moral concept. “There are always concrete human groupings which fight other
concrete human groupings in the name of justice, humanity, order, or peace. When being
reproached for immorality and cynicism, the spectator of political phenomena can always
recognize in such reproaches a political weapon used in actual combat.”33
“The political” is not a philosophical idea or indeed an idea of any sort: it is a
concrete, existential reality. Political concepts have only polemical meanings. They may
sound philosophical or universal, but in truth “[t]hey are focused on a specific conflict
26
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and are bound to a concrete situation; . . . and they turn into empty and ghostlike
abstractions when this situation disappears.”34 Strictly speaking, then, Schmitt denies the
very possibility of political philosophy. There are only political jabs and thrusts disguised
as philosophy.
For Schmitt, indeed, the category of the political devours all other categories, not
merely political philosophy. There is no escaping politics into a disinterested realm of
any sort.
Above all the polemical character determines the use of the word political
regardless of whether the adversary is designated as nonpolitical (in the sense of
harmless), or vice versa if one wants to disqualify or denounce him as political in
order to portray oneself as nonpolitical (in the sense of purely scientific, purely
moral, purely juristic, purely aesthetic, purely economic, or on the basis of similar
purities) and thereby superior.35
We can understand Schmitt’s point through a contemporary example: debates over
climate change or the theory of evolution. Some people think that whether man-made
greenhouse gasses cause dangerous climate change is a scientific question; so is the
question of whether human beings evolved from nonhuman ancestors. But those who
think that on scientific issues we should defer to science fail to understand that the
concept of the political devours science along with everything else. If scientific
conclusions would imply that we must change our way of life, we will reject the
conclusions and, if necessary, destroy the scientists. If the scientists complain that attacks
on their character, integrity, or honesty are “political,” we will (for political reasons)
denounce their response as merely political.
That is what Schmitt means by saying that “the polemical character determines
the use of the word political.” Even the word political is political: we use it to smear and
undermine the claims of our adversaries. “Terminological questions become . . . highly
political.”36 Then, after denouncing the scientists’ defense of themselves as political, we
will continue to slime them, and try as hard as we can to get them fired, defunded, and
silenced. They may have thought they were answering a scientific, technical question.
But in the world of politics there are no technical questions, only political questions.
Hobbes recognized this when he wrote:
I doubt not, but if it had been a thing contrary to any mans right of dominion, or to
the interest of men that have dominion, That the three Angles of a Triangle,
should be equall to two Angles of a Square; that doctrine should have been, if not
disputed, yet by the burning of all books of Geometry, suppressed, as farre as he
whom it concerned was able.37
Of course Schmitt does not deny that that science, or art, or law, or geometry can be
apolitical, provided political bodies find them harmless to their way of life; even more so
if they find them useful in political conflicts. There is no denying that a state can
34

Id. at 30.
Id. at 31–32. That includes the purely religious, as Schmitt makes clear. Id. at 39. God may be above
politics but faith in God is not.
36
Id. at 31.
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THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 74, Ch. XI (Richard Tuck ed.).
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sometimes gain political advantage by promoting a flourishing cultural scene. But politics
remains primary in the sense that it is up to political actors to decide when an artist or
scientist becomes politically dangerous; if they do, there will be no such thing as art for
art’s sake or science for the sake of knowledge. The scientists’ protests of apolitical
innocence will be condemned as an especially crafty political ruse.
Notice that in the paragraph quoted above Schmitt includes the “purely juristic” as
one of the polemical stances enemies can take when they pretend to be nonpolitical—as a
way to be political. The ICRC claims it is making impartial, “purely juristic” arguments
about the laws of war.38 Lawfare critics recognize that ICRC’s claim to be purely juristic
and nonpolitical is simply an insidious way of being political, of waging lawfare against
states with powerful armies. The ICRC pretends to be neutral—one of the tell-tale signs
by which we recognize the enemy. In one of most significant sentences in his book,
Schmitt writes: “The high points of politics are simultaneously the moments in which the
enemy is, in concrete reality, recognized as the enemy.”39 The lawfare critique is, in
Schmitt’s sense, a high point of politics.
Schmitt denounces all “neutralizations and depoliticizations,”40 which for him are
the hallmarks of liberalism. There are no neutralizations: if you are not with us you are
against us and we will destroy you: “If a part of the population declares that it no longer
recognizes enemies, then, depending on the circumstance, it joins their side and aids
them.”41 You may not be interested in politics, but politics is interested in you.
Is there any escape from the all-consuming quicksand of politics? Not according
to Schmitt: “If a people no longer possesses the energy or the will to maintain itself in the
sphere of politics, the latter will not thereby vanish from the world. Only a weak people
will disappear.”42 To retreat from politics invites annihilation; to yearn for a respite from
politics is to yearn for death.
One additional idea, not very apparent in The Concept of the Political, comes out
in some of Schmitt’s later works, particularly his 1962 lectures on what we would today
call terrorism, The Theory of the Partisan: Intermediate Commentary on the Concept of
the Political, and his 1950 book on international law, The Nomos of the Earth. It would
be a mistake to think that Schmitt rejects the idea of laws governing warfare, or, for that
matter, that he idealizes war and rejects humanitarian restraint. Rather, he believes that
the ability to “bracket” war—to limit it according to the jus in bello principles of noncombatant immunity and avoidance of unnecessary suffering—is a historically contingent
achievement of European public law, restricted to sovereigns who treat war as akin to a
38

Statutes of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, adopted by the 25th International
Conference of the Red Cross, Geneva, 23–31 October 1986, Article 5(2)(c) and (g) (mandating the ICRC
“to work for the faithful application of international humanitarian law applicable in armed conflicts and …
to prepare any development thereof”). See generally, Yves Sandoz, The International Committee of the Red
Cross as guardian of international humanitarian law, ICRC Resource Centre (Dec. 31, 1998), available at
http://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/misc/about-the-icrc-311298.htm (describing the ICRC‘s
“guardian angel” function of “watching over the law itself to protect it from those who may undermine or
weaken it”).
39
SCHMITT, supra note 17, at 67.
40
See id. at 69, 80, and 89.
41
Id. at 51.
42
Id. at 53.

10
duel among gentlemen. The jus publicum Europaeanum collapsed through the rise of
America, the advent of air-power that detaches warfare from territory, and non-state
warriors who ruthlessly wage absolute war. With it collapsed the possibility of
“bracketed” warfare.
At this point, all the pieces of the argument are in place. A world divided into friends
and enemies locked in existential struggle with real, non-metaphorical killing as the
permanent backdrop. A critique of “humanitarianism” as a political ruse. A contempt of
liberals for their weakness and their failure to recognize death struggle as man’s fate. A
thoroughgoing skepticism about neutral, apolitical arguments of any sort, including legal
arguments. An insistence that even those who think they can transcend politics into a
more neutral, objective realm of science, law, economics, or philosophy are aiding the
enemy and can be treated as enemies. An insistence that laws of armed conflict,
particularly laws protecting non-combatants, depend on reciprocity among states
belonging to the classical order of European public law, and that war against terrorists
can never be bracketed. Schmitt has invented the critique of lawfare.
III. Schmitt, Strauss, and the Question of Influence
Did Carl Schmitt actually exert any influence on contemporary lawfare critics? I
do not know the answer—you would have to ask them. On its face, the proposition seems
unlikely: Schmitt was barely discussed outside academic circles, or even much discussed
within academic circles, until the middle of the millenial decade. The current edition of
The Concept of the Political appeared in 2007; his influential Political Theology was out
of print in English for a decade before its 2006 reprint; and the English translations of
most of Schmitt’s other books appeared after 2005.43 A Lexis search reveals five law
review references to Schmitt between 1980 and 1990; 114 between 1990 and 2000; and
420 since 2000, with almost twice as many in the last five years as the previous five.
One possible connection, noted in 2005 by Scott Horton, is through Leo Strauss.44
Strauss’s youthful essay on The Concept of the Political is included in the book’s English
translation.45 Strauss applauded Schmitt’s critique of liberalism enthusiastically, and his
only criticisms of Schmitt were that Schmitt masked the extent of his nausea (Strauss’s
word) over pacifism and liberalism, and refrained from following his own argument to
the inevitable conclusion that humanitarian ideals are not merely unrealistic, but are
actually immoral and must be combated.46 Strauss’s essay demanded a less kind, less
gentle Schmitt—one might say that Strauss’s essay is Schmitt without a humanitarian
face. Strauss, unlike Schmitt, has exerted a powerful and lasting influence on American
politics, in no small part because so many Straussians have occupied positions in
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government, journalism, and the neoconservative movement.47 Neoconservatives have
been among the most vigorous lawfare critics.
But I am not arguing for a causal influence of Schmitt on lawfare critics, because
I cannot demonstrate that it is there. Rather, I am arguing that Schmitt’s philosophy offers
the best articulation I have found of the lawfare critique. It may be time for lawfare critics
to take ownership of their ancestor.
IV. Schmitt’s Misrepresentation of Politics
What can be said in response to Schmitt?48 A full-fledged assessment of Schmitt’s
views lies beyond my aim in this short paper. But I would like to raise some points that
bear specifically on the lawfare debate.
Start with Schmitt’s insistence that the term “political” is itself polemical.49 This
amounts to a hidden, self-referential caution to readers that Schmitt’s own concept of the
political is polemical. It is not neutral, objective, academic, or philosophical. It is slanted,
biased, and loaded. Schmitt tells us that much, but he never holds the mirror to himself
and tell us exactly how his concept is loaded.
My answer is that even though “that’s just political!” is often an accusation, the
word “political” has positive associations in our tradition, which Schmitt cunningly trades
on. Aristotle proclaimed that man is the zoôn politikon, the political animal, and argued
that the political life is the best and freest life for man as a practical being.50 It would
seem to follow, then, that pacifists or humanitarians who yearn for the end of bloody
friend-enemy polarities want to destroy something essential to human beings. At several
points in The Concept of the Political, duly noted by Strauss, Schmitt hints, without
actually saying, that even if it were possible to expunge deadly friend-enemy dyads from
the world it would not be desirable. It would shrink the meaningfulness of human life to
mere entertainment; life would at most be interesting, but never meaningful.51 Strauss
seizes on these hints that a depoliticized world would be a sub-human world and insists
that this is Schmitt’s actual view.52
We hear in Strauss echoes of Nietzsche’s contempt for “the last man,” the postdangerous man, the timid bourgeois—about whom Schmitt too speaks with contempt.53
Without politics, man would not be man. He would be a tamed puppy. Schmitt does not
quite say this, but he hints at it: “Were this entity [the friend-enemy grouping] to
47
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disappear, . . . then the political itself would disappear.”54 That sounds pretty scary if you
have positive Aristotelian associations with politics, but in fact, Schmitt’s assertion is a
mere tautology. He has defined the concept of the political as the friend-enemy grouping,
so by definition if the friend-enemy grouping disappears the political disappears. So
what? The only thing that makes this assertion sound significant is the set of
associations—absent from Schmitt’s friend-enemy construct—that makes us think the
political is a form of community rather than antipathy, and therefore that the political is
indispensible to meaningful human life.
Among these associations is the positive, constructive side of politics, the very
foundation of Aristotle’s conception of politics, which Schmitt completely ignores.
Politics, we often say, is the art of the possible. It is the medium for organizing all human
cooperation. Peaceable civilization, civil institutions, and elemental tasks such as
collecting the garbage and delivering food to hungry mouths all depend on politics. Of
course, peering into the sausage factory of even such mundane municipal institutions as
the town mayor’s office will reveal plenty of nasty politicking, jockeying for position and
patronage, and downright corruption. Schmitt sneers at these as “banal forms of politics, .
. . all sorts of tactics and practices, competitions and intrigues” and dismisses them
contemptuously as “parasite- and caricature-like formations.”55 The fact is that Schmitt
has nothing whatever to say about the constructive side of politics, nor about local
politics; and his entire theory focuses on enemies, not friends. In my small community,
political meetings debate issues as trivial as whether to close a street and divert the traffic
to another street. It is hard to see mortal combat as even a remote possibility in such
disputes, and so, in Schmitt’s view, they would not count as politics, but merely
administration. Yet issues like these are the stuff of peaceable human politics.
Schmitt, I have said, uses the word “political” polemically—in his sense,
politically. I have suggested that his very choice of the word “political” to describe
mortal enmity is tendentious, attaching to mortal enmity Aristotelian and republican
associations quite foreign to it. But the more basic point is that Schmitt’s critique of
humanitarianism as political and polemical is itself political and polemical. In a word, the
critique of lawfare is itself lawfare. It is self-undermining because to the extent that it
succeeds in showing that lawfare is illegitimate, it de-legitimizes itself.
What about the merits of Schmitt’s critique of humanitarianism? His argument is
straightforward: either humanitarianism is toothless and apolitical, in which case ruthless
political actors will destroy the humanitarians; or else humanitarianism is a fighting faith,
in which case it has succumbed to the political but made matters worse, because wars on
behalf of humanity are the most inhuman wars of all. Liberal humanitarianism is either
too weak or too savage.
The argument has obvious merit. When Schmitt wrote in 1932 that wars against
“outlaws of humanity” would be the most horrible of all, it is hard not to salute him as a
prophet of Hiroshima. The same is true when Schmitt writes about the League of
Nations’ resolution to use “economic sanctions and severance of the food supply,”56
54

Id. at 45.
Id. at 30.
56
Id. at 79.
55

13
which he calls “imperialism based on pure economic power.”57 Schmitt is no
warmonger—he calls the killing of human beings for any reason other than warding off
an existential threat “sinister and crazy”58—nor is he indifferent to human suffering.
But international humanitarian law and criminal law are not the same thing as
wars to end all war or humanitarian military interventions, so Schmitt’s important moral
warning against ultimate military self-righteousness does not really apply.59 Nor does
“bracketing” war by humanitarian constraints on war-fighting presuppose a vanished
order of European public law. The fact is that in nine years of conventional war, the
United States has significantly bracketed war-fighting, even against enemies who do not
recognize duties of reciprocity.60 This may frustrate current lawfare critics who complain
that American soldiers in Afghanistan are being forced to put down their guns.
Bracketing warfare is a decision—Schmitt might call it an existential decision—that rests
in part on values that transcend the friend-enemy distinction. Liberal values are not alien
extrusions into politics or evasions of politics; they are part of politics, and, as Stephen
Holmes argued against Schmitt, liberalism has proven remarkably strong, not weak.61
We could choose to abandon liberal humanitarianism, and that would be a political
decision. It would simply be a bad one.
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